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From about the middle of the century there was a change of emphasis in the 
language of virtue. This was the growing vogue for a form of natural virtue, 
based on the belief that virtue was an innate and sociable quality which 
predisposed people to seek to benefit others.1 Although virtue had originally 
implied a masculine quality, this new emphasis tended to accord a pre-eminent 
place to women and to qualities considered particularly feminine. Women were 
thought to have more natural sentiments than men, to be closer to nature. Their 
natural feelings had not been curbed by the demands of a public career, military 
service or the market place. Their virtue was also said to be purer than men’s 
because women were much less likely to be susceptible to the ‘passions’. But this 
new stress on womanly virtue tended to accentuate traditional female qualities of 
devotion to family and home. The gap between natural virtue and political status 
was far from easy for women to bridge.  
The ideal of the naturally virtuous woman found its most vigorous 
expression in the pages of literature. The novel form was particularly conducive 
to the exploration of the social position of women; all the more so since women 
were effectively excluded from specifically political theory. Fictional discussions 
provided space in which to formulate new conceptions of the moral role of 
women. As early as 1750 the novel form had witnessed a shift in attitudes. Moral 
virtue was fast becoming a quality which was associated more often with 
‘womanliness’ than with ‘manliness’.2  
The tradition of fictional writing featuring virtuous women and their moral 
dilemmas went back at least as far as La Princesse de Clèves, Madame de La 
Fayette’s novel of 1678; but the heroine of this book was a member of courtly 
society and her struggle to maintain her virtue was largely confined to her inner 
moral world. Subsequent novels were more prepared to assess women’s virtue in 
relation to society at large and demonstrate the impact of virtuous women on the 
lives of others. The moving heroines of Richardson’s novels Pamela, or Virtue 
Rewarded, and Clarissa (Clarissa Harlowe was translated by Prévost in 1751) 
enjoyed almost a cult status in France and helped to strengthen enthusiasm for 
novels that dealt with the vicissitudes of feminine virtue. Both these novels took 
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as their focus a struggle between a virtuous woman and an unscrupulous man of 
superior birth and social status who lacked moral integrity. The inference was 
that an elevated social position was more likely to engender pride and even vice, 
whilst virtue belonged to the socially obscure, and particularly to women. This 
theme was to be played out with innumerable variations, on both sides of the 
Channel.  
One of the earliest and most influential examples of the new emphasis on 
feminine virtue in literary form came in Madame de Graffigny’s Lettres d’une 
Péruvienne (first published in 1747). This book made a great impact and went 
through many editions, retaining its popularity right up until the end of the 
century. Its heroine, the Inca princess, Zilia was kidnapped by Spaniards, and 
later taken to France. Though exiled from her native land, Zilia retained her 
loyalty to her own religion and her culture, as well as her own moral values, 
based on nature rather than the artificial values of so-called civilisation. She was 
one of the first fictional examples of the  ‘noble savage’, although ‘virtuous 
savage’ would be a more accurate description. Her position as an isolated and 
perpetual outsider in French society enabled her to comment - often critically - on 
it for she was not subject to its values. The French, she claimed, admired luxury 
(le superflu) more than virtue or honesty, or good sense.3 Coming as she did from 
a simpler people than the French, she was closer to nature, truth and virtue. 
‘Happy is the nation which has no other guide than nature, takes truth as its 
principle, and has virtue as its inspiration.’4 The French by contrast were drawn to 
superficiality and duplicity. They lacked self-respect. The lamentable effects of 
this were seen mostly clearly in the treatment of women, about which Zilia was 
openly scathing. She criticised in particular the way in which marriage was used 
to debase women, and also the poor education offered to girls, which positively 
discouraged true virtue and merit.5 Girls were taught to comport themselves 
genteelly, and attend to outward appearances, to ‘regulate their bodily 
movements, control their facial expressions, maintain an outward decorum, such 
are the essential tasks of their education...’ Parents prided themselves on these 
achievements, whilst neglecting to tell their daughters ‘that an honest 
countenance is nothing more than hypocrisy if it does not stem from honesty of 
the soul.’6  
Zilia’s virtue was transparent, like the mirror in which she saw her own 
reflection for the first time, much to her amazement. She was uncorrupted, and 
therefore in her moral judgements she saw things as they truly were. She later 
learned, however, that her betrothed, Aza (to whom she had been writing her 
letters) had succumbed to the blandishments of the Europeans, adopted 
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Christianity and betrayed both Zilia and his native culture. Unlike him, we are 
told, Zilia spoke no Spanish and learned French fairly late in the novel. Language 
itself is suspect. It is a means of deceit, for people use it to lie to and mislead one 
another. Thus the Spanish conquerors lied to Aza. But Zilia was not deceived by 
language. Her very ignorance preserved her. Actions, not words, counted for her.7 
Aza, however, adopted what Zilia would describe as ‘the fantastic honour of 
Europe’, and in so doing abandoned the virtue and sincerity so fundamental to 
his people.8 In common with many fictional women of the eighteenth century 
Zilia’s virtue was stronger than that of the men around her, and came to her more 
naturally because she was immune from the passions to which men were so 
susceptible. Although she had been abandoned by the man she loved, she 
remained true to him and rejected the proposal of marriage made to her by the 
Frenchman, Déterville, who loved her. She asked Déterville to renounce his 
‘tumultuous sentiments’ which caused him such anguish. In place of love she 
could offer him true friendship and cultivate in his heart ‘virtues which you have 
not known there.’9 Thus the ‘civilised’ Frenchman will learn the meaning of true 
virtue from the woman ‘savage’.  
A woman was more likely to be virtuous than a man because she was 
believed to be less susceptible to sexual passions. The woman herself was socially 
fairly powerless - reflecting the actual position of most women in society. But in 
fiction at least, a woman was empowered by her virtue. Her virtue acted as a 
measure, a standard against which the state of society, and the integrity of men 
might be judged. Therefore women could be a force for moral virtue, though their 
influence was confined to their own immediate circle - family, friends, 
neighbours, the poor.  
Was this a ‘bourgeois’ virtue? It was anti-aristocratic or, more accurately, a 
reaction against the courtly values of the honnête femme so in vogue amongst the 
previous generation. Noble women embraced the ideal as frequently as bourgeois 
ones, at least in their literary preferences. Madame de Genlis even called her 
daughter ‘Pamela’. But she was a member of the court nobility and as such had 
wider choices open to her than most bourgeois women when it came to the codes 
by which she lived her life The rather more relaxed moral codes of the court 
offered an alternative value system which proved rather more enticing than a life 
of suffering martyred virtue. Clarissa’s sad fate was very edifying and 
emotionally involving, but hardly one that any woman would wish to emulate. 
As for the fictional Pamela, as everyone knew, in real life virtue was very rarely 
rewarded, and a servant girl who clung to her virtue was highly unlikely to find 
her wealthy employer capitulating and offering her marriage. 
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One of the most influential writers on women’s virtue in the eighteenth 
century was Rousseau, of course. But in this respect (as in much else) he played a 
somewhat ambiguous and contradictory role. The most negative (even notorious) 
judgement on women’s virtue was that which he offered in Emile. Having spent 
many pages grooming Emile for citizenship and setting him on the path that will 
one day lead to Emile becoming a ‘man of virtue’, Rousseau used the section on 
Emile’s future mate, Sophie, to set out his ideas about the nature of woman and 
the education best suited to her role in life. It was remarked by many 
contemporaries that his approach here was in marked contrast to his radical ideas 
about the education of boys. Emile was to be taught to cultivate independence of 
mind, to set store on inner integrity rather than on social appearances. Emile was 
to be a true man, at one with himself. His education was designed to be in 
accordance with nature. Sophie’s upbringing owed much less to ‘nature’ than to 
traditional cultural expectations about the role of women in French society. The 
qualities to be instilled in her were much closer to the artificial and stilted values 
of the outmoded model of the honnête femme than the independent virtue of a 
Clarissa or a Zilia. According to Rousseau, Sophie’s education should 
complement her nature, but he argued that the nature of woman was different in 
almost every essential respect from that of man. Emile was taught to be free, to 
think for himself. Sophie was to be subject to restriction, conformity and the 
systematic stifling both of her natural bodily self-expression, and the use of her 
reason. Chastity was by far the most important virtue for her. Not only that, for 
Sophie, appearances were vital. It was not enough for her to be virtuous; she must 
also seem to be virtuous.  
It is not only important for a wife to be faithful, but to be judged to be so 
by her husband, by her neighbours and by all the world; it is important for 
her to be modest, attentive, reserved, and to display before others, just as to 
her inner self, the evidence of her virtue.10 
  
This was the old double standard under a different guise. Now nature, rather 
than God, was the authority on which the subjection of women was based. For 
Sophie as a woman the category of ‘seeming’ was more crucial than ‘being’, than 
her own inner thoughts. Sophie could only exist in relation to society and 
particularly the eyes of her father and husband, not as an individual in her own 
right.  
Man, in doing good, relies only on himself, and can brave public opinion; 
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but woman in doing good, only fulfils one half of her duty, and what 
people think of her is as important as what she really is. It follows that her 
system of education must be different is this respect to our own: opinion is 
the tomb of men’s virtue, but it is the throne of women’s virtue.11  
 
 Had Rousseau’s view of women rested only upon his portrayal of Sophie 
we would have been hard put to it to understand why so many of his women 
readers found him an inspirational author. But Rousseau’s portrait of Julie, the 
heroine and focal point of La Nouvelle Héloïse was much more positive - and also 
much more admired by most female contemporaries.12 Julie was a more subtle, 
independent-minded and attractive figure than the sadly doll-like and passive 
Sophie. The key to Julie’s strength lay in her virtue. Nor did her virtue consist 
primarily in the appearance - or even reality - of chastity. On the contrary, Julie 
lost her chastity early on in the novel, to her tutor, Saint-Preux, the man she loved 
and who loved her. Her friend Clare wrote to her, having heard that Julie and 
Saint-Preux had become lovers, making this point explicitly: 
... how many virtues you still have in spite of the one that is lost. 
Will you be less gentle, less sincere, less modest, less bienfaisant? 
Will you be, in a word, less worthy of all our homage? Will honour, 
humanity, friendship and pure love be less dear to your heart?13 
 
For Julie, then, chastity was only one of the virtues. She remained the 
moral focus of the novel. It was she who spoke out in forthright terms 
against the practice of duelling when she heard that her lover intended to 
fight on a point of honour. She could see clearly the essential futility of 
that elitist means of gauging the worth of a man. 
Oh God! what is this miserable honour that does not fear vice but only 
public blame... 
Oh my friend! If you sincerely love virtue, learn to serve it after its own 
fashion, and not after the mode of men... is the word virtue only an empty 
name for you, and will you only be virtuous when it costs you nothing to 
be so?14 
  
 She was not speaking here merely as a woman, pleading and tearful, afraid 
for the safety of the man she loved. Rather she asserted her own right to make 
moral and philosophical judgements. As a virtuous woman she was empowered 
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to speak out against the false expectations of noble honour which were based on 
social appearances. It is through her eyes above all that the reader is shown that 
traditional concepts of male honour offered a woefully inadequate moral code by 
which to live. 
 When Julie bowed to her father’s wishes and married the man of his 
choice, Wolmar, Rousseau presented this as a positive choice. Through her 
submission she redeemed herself for the loss of her chastity. She achieved a 
higher virtue through her denial of passion which Rousseau always saw as 
inimical to virtue, in this case her illicit passion for Saint-Preux. In submitting to 
patriarchal authority Julie gave up her own individual autonomy, but received in 
exchange moral power, as the virtuous wife and mother. She is transfigured: as 
wife, mother, friend, mistress of the household, and benefactress of the villagers, 
she generates sublime virtue all around her and becomes the emotional heart of 
the idyllic little community at Clarens.  She and her husband became dispensers 
of bienfaisance, helping the poor and sick and she thus had the happiness of 
transforming their lives and being blessed by them. Even her former lover was 
swept up by the example of virtue which she giave, and was transformed by it. 
But Julie’s self-mastery was achieved with immense effort, and the suggestion in 
her final letter is that by her death Julie escaped the conflict between her passions 
and her virtue.15 
Elsewhere in the novel, however, the social codes that exacted 
conventional moral behaviour, particularly for women, were enforced by Julie 
and her husband. Julie may have been a reformed sinner, but for other women 
social redemption was more difficult to acquire. We learn, for example, that 
Milord Edouard, the English lord and friend of Saint-Preux, had loved a former 
prostitute, Laure. She subsequently reformed her life, and now loves virtue, but it 
would still be wrong, we are told, for him to marry her.16 Julie herself sees her 
role as mentor for her servants partly in terms of ensuring that the sexes are kept 
apart to avoid unsuitable liaisons. The servants are encouraged to denounce each 
other for moral failings, replicating Roman mores.17 
Rousseau’s view of women has tended to provoke outrage in his modern 
readers. But to most women of his own time his heroines, motivated by their 
sensibility and inspiring love, offered an attractive image. They provided women 
with an empowering model within that sphere in which they actually led their 
lives and helped to give them a sense of their own worth as wives and as mothers. 
To paraphrase Mary Wollstonecraft (who admired the education of Emile, whilst 
loathing the portrait of Sophie) such women had power over their men, not over 
themselves. But power for women as independent individuals was simply not an 
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option for most women in the eighteenth century. And Julie - and even Sophie - 
certainly had an edge over those tales of  Lucretia and other virtuous women of 
antiquity who appeared somewhat cold and austere, lacking sensibility and 
natural feeling. When Mercier was editor of the popular and pioneering journal 
for women, the Journal des Dames, he depicted the Spartan women who put patrie 
before their children as extreme and inhumane. Most of his women readers 
would probably have agreed with him.18   
Rousseau’s contribution to debates about the role of women was 
contradictory in its effects. Some women writers took up the challenge of his 
ideas, and used them strategically, adopting those aspects which appealed to 
them and ignoring some of his more chauvinist pronouncements.19 The question 
of women’s education and their potential for virtue was pursued with renewed 
vigour in a number of works and often with conclusions that conflicted with those 
of Rousseau.20 For example, Mme de Genlis’ work, Adèle et Théodore, ou Lettres sur 
l’éducation owed much to Rousseau’s ideas about virtue as the goal of education. 
She was not an uncritical admirer of the Rousseauist view, and extended some of 
his arguments about education to include women. Nevertheless, there was little 
to shock or scandalise in the kind of virtue she envisaged as suitable for young 
girls. It was a socially conformist quality: ‘I understand virtue to mean the taste 
for honest things, founded on principles, and fortified by the habit of doing 
good.’21 In a similar Rousseauist vein was Mme d’Epinay’s Les conversations 
d’Emilié (1774 and 1782) which was also much more sympathetic to the idea that 
the potential of girls could be considerably expanded if given the opportunity. 
Sometimes men took a more radical view of the possibilities of education for 
women than women writers themselves, possibly because it was harder for even 
the boldest woman to be seen to be too outspoken about the extent to which the 
perceived inadequacies of women were imposed upon them by men. A few men 
went so far as to contend that women’s potential for virtue was as great as that of 
men’s, but that they had been consistently denied the opportunity to develop it, 
confined to the domestic sphere and taught to cultivate a narrow outlook. One of 
these was J.F. Dumas: a future Jacobin, whose younger brother was to be the 
president of the Revolutionary Tribunal in the Year II. J.F. Dumas wrote a prize-
winning essay for the Academy of Châlons-sur-Marne in answer to the question, 
Quels sont les moyens de perfectionner l’éducation des jeunes demoiselles? (1783) in 
which he argued that there was no difference between the capacities of men and 
women, only in the education that they were given. Given an equal education, 
women would be as capable of virtue as men: 
One cannot doubt that they are capable of the greatest virtues: the 
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substance from which they are fashioned is not different in nature to 
ourselves. Why then deny them the faculties of feeling, thinking and 
reasoning? And if they have such faculties, what right have we to state 
their limits?22  
 
It followed from this that women’s vices stemmed mostly from the fact that they 
were being deliberately kept in ignorance, ‘women are not ordinarily more 
virtuous than they are enlightened’.23 Dumas’ views on women were radical up to 
a point, but he accepted that women would still be socially subservient to men, 
since custom dictated this, and that they should play no role in politics. He did 
think that they should learn ‘political science’, but this was for the somewhat 
curious reason that they would then be better able to understand the human 
heart.24 
In an essay inspired by the same contest, Choderlos de Laclos took both a 
more radical and a more pessimistic view of the situation. He did not question 
women’s potential to be citizens and the equals of men, but he said that their will 
had been sapped by the habits of slavery, which was a state incompatible with 
virtuous citizenship. Women, destined to be the companions of men, had become 
their slaves and had come to prefer, ‘vices that are debasing, but useful, to virtues 
that are more painful for a free and self-respecting being’. If women wanted to 
emerge from this state of slavery, education was not enough, it would only 
alleviate the symptoms without effecting a cure. Men would not help women, he 
wrote; they had, ‘neither the will, nor the power’. This kind of subjugation called 
for a social transformation on a cataclysmic scale,  ‘... one does not emancipate 
oneself from slavery except by a great revolution’.25 
 
 Overtly political theory had little place for women - they were principally 
there either as symbols of abstract virtue or as catalysts for male action. But in the 
wider question of the relationship between politics and morality women had a 
significant place. Increasingly morality was associated with women and as such 
they were seen as having an impact on the moral health of the nation. Women, it 
was said, had a civilising influence on ‘society’ (i.e. men) through their gentleness, 
culture and sensibility, their proximity to nature, which provided a counterpoint 
for the more brutish passions of men.26 Their influence was largely indirect. 
Custom and culture dictated that women should not participate in public life, and 
relatively few women were prepared to challenge this convention. But by laying 
stress on the importance of good ‘moeurs’ for social improvement and moral 
regeneration, it could be argued that women could play an important social role 
 9 
in uniting and regenerating society.  What began as a role within a woman’s own 
family could be extended to include a wider community, and thus might aid the 
reform of the ‘nation’.27 
 
The idea that women could be standard-bearers of refinement and morality, 
through qualities that complemented rather than imitated those of men, found its 
way into many of the conduct books of the period. Typical of these was L’Ami des 
femmes by Boudier de Villemert, a popular work which went through many 
editions but was first published in 1758, thus predating Rousseau’s major 
contributions on femininity.28 Boudier de Villemert emphasised the moral virtue 
of women, and their superiority over male passion in a classic formula, repeated 
many times since. The roles of the two sexes were not equal, but were 
complementary. Their virtues also complemented each other. The coming 
together of male and female virtues ensured the harmony which kept society 
balanced and morally thriving. To women belonged ‘those amiable virtues that 
console and embellish humanity’.29 Social harmony arose from each sex fulfilling 
its separate - but equally valuable - functions in their own sphere.30 Women’s role 
was to refine men and improve them morally, through their influence on their 
husbands and children, but also on society itself.   
Let women understand their duties therefore, and carry them out to their 
own benefit and our own. They have given us examples of the highest 
virtues; examples which exert a great power over us, for the sweet hold 
that women have over us inclines us to follow their example. We shall 
always be what women want us to be; and it is in their own power to 
change for good or ill the face of society, and to give to men the character 
that they would wish them to have.31 
 
Most women lived better-regulated lives than men and were much less 
susceptible to sexual passion. Virtuous women would not, he said, take part in 
matters relating to politics and to government, but what need had they of such 
political rights, when they had such power over men.32  
It was not only men who viewed the matter in this light. Most women 
agreed though, like Madame de Lambert, they sometimes gave the impression 
that they were accepting with reluctance and resignation one of the few 
opportunities open to them to make a positive contribution in a world in which 
they were effectively barred from a more active role.  
A notable venue for women’s ideas was the Journal des Dames. Like all 
permitted journals it was not allowed to engage in political matters. But it had 
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several women editors who evinced strong ideas about the potential 
achievements of women. When Madame de Montanclos became its editor she set 
out her views in an introductory letter, written in the month when the parlements 
were recalled and the language of citizenship was very much in the air. She 
declared that the avowed goal of the Journal was to spread the example of 
women’s virtue: 
... the particular goal of this journal is to make known the virtues, spirit 
and talents of the Sex to which it is dedicated. It is not that I wish to make 
great claims for myself, but it is true that I do wish to oblige men to render 
to women the justice that it has pleased them to deny us. It is hardly 
flattering to us that men should pay tribute to the charms that nature has 
given us, if they then want to denigrate the virtues and talents that Heaven 
has given us. I want to make it known, if I can, that we can do all the good 
of which humanity is capable, because it is in our souls to do so...33 
 
A similarly appreciative view of specifically ‘feminine’ virtues was taken by 
Thomas in his Essai sur le caractère, les moeurs et l’esprit des femmes. This was the 
work that provoked Diderot into writing his work Sur les Femmes. Of the two, 
Diderot’s work is the better-known now both for its sympathy for women’s 
situation and for its pessimism about the possibilities for changing their lot, whilst 
Thomas’s work has faded into relative obscurity. But it was Thomas’s work which 
was the more typical of views on women at that time, and which exerted a greater 
influence on contemporary opinion.34 He argued that women had a positive social 
role to play, a role that grew out of their virtue. According to Thomas, women 
were, ‘the most virtuous sex, as well as the most tender-hearted’.35 He gave 
numerous historical examples from the classics of women who exemplified 
political and patriotic virtues, though like many others he found the single-
minded virtues of Spartan women distasteful rather than admirable.36 He 
concluded that the situation was very different in modern France, and the two 
forms of government, monarchy and republic could not be compared. Nowadays 
it was almost exclusively men who possessed the patriotic virtues. In France 
women no longer possessed the virtue of ‘love of the patrie’, or that of ‘the general 
love of humanity’; their virtue did not extend to such abstract levels, but 
expressed itself in concern for their families and in those close to them.37 Thomas 
went through all the private or domestic virtues point by point, comparing them 
in men and women, and deciding that in most of these virtues, it was women who 
excelled.38 Most importantly, they possessed the greatest degree of bienfaisance, 
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that quality of active, social, philanthropic virtue. Thomas described bienfaisance 
as ‘this compassion which unites people in spirit to the less fortunate.... It is well 
known that women have the greatest share of this quality. Everything in their 
natures predisposes them to be softened by pity’.39 The idea that women were 
particularly suited to bienfaisance was founded on the traditional role of women as 
dispensers of charity, especially through the church. But as the term bienfaisance 
acquired a more actively social resonance, so were women able to play a more 
socially responsible role, which extended beyond their own families to the 
unfortunate. 
 
When women delved into the history books the repertoire of virtuous 
heroines available to them was certainly limited. Mostly they were dutiful wives 
and daughters. Women might make patriotic gestures, but these were set within 
the confines of what was considered to be suitable feminine behaviour. 
Occasionally, however, historical women were seen to undertake warlike acts. 
These were women who held important positions of public responsibility, usually 
through their husbands. Circumstances might call upon a woman to act in 
defence of the patrie, and then she would act like a hero with warlike ‘virtus’. 
Madame de Genlis, for example, quoted the story of the princess of Khitan, who 
suppressed a mutiny in her husband’s army during his absence. Another tale she 
recalled approvingly was an account of how one of the wives of the emperor 
Han-ngai-ti of China protected her husband from an escaped bear by throwing 
herself between them. She later told him, ‘I am only a women, my life is of little 
account to the happiness and tranquillity of the state: but your own life is 
essential to it, I should not hesitate to sacrifice my life to save yours.’40 This again 
was women’s virtue as sacrifice, though here the point of her sacrifice is to benefit 
the state and the public good, rather than to simply save her husband. In most 
such historical tales the proviso was added that the heroine in question played a 
public role only reluctantly and out of necessity, since it was understood that a 
virtuous woman would not desire to play a public role. 
There was often interest in how virtue might be given a feminine twist. 
Madame de Montanclos, for example, an editor of the Journal des dames 
considered the story of St Louis from quite a different perspective from that of the 
traditional annual panegyrics.  Rather than write about the renowned king 
himself, she turned her attention to his mother, Blanche de Castille on the 
understanding that behind every strong man there is an even tougher woman. 
She said that, just as men wanted to hear about the virtues of a Cato, or Marcus 
Aurelius, so women in their turn wanted to hear stories of ‘the heroines who have 
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earned their place in the glory of nations’.41 According to Montanclos, it was to his 
mother that the king owed the public virtues which had so often been praised. 
Indeed, she declared, when given the opportunity by Louis's absence at the 
crusades, Blanche herself had been a better ruler than her own son because she 
had had the welfare of the people more truly at heart. She had given the people 
an example of virtue, relieved the poor, ensured the happiness of the people and 
skilfully maintained the peace. She had opposed the crusades as a waste of life 
and money, showing a greater degree of statecraft and consciousness of the 
‘public good’ than Louis had done, for he had put ‘passion’ and ‘his zeal’ before 
the good of the nation.42 Feminine virtue gave the nation peace, and this was 
ultimately better for the nation than traditional warrior virtues. 
Sometimes virtuous heroines were depicted as regarding the public good as 
separate from - and even more important than - their duty to their husbands. For 
example, the Journal des Dames recounted the story of Cezely, Dame de Barry, an 
example of ‘French virtues’ who took over the defence of the town of Leucate 
during the time of the League, after her husband had been taken hostage by the 
rebels. She continued to hold the town, even though the rebels carried out their 
threat to execute her husband - thus putting loyalty to the king and the patrie 
above wifely duty: a bad wife, but a virtuous woman.43 
 
We have seen that there were two principal methods by which women’s 
virtue could be delineated. The first was the argument that, since men and 
women were fundamentally alike, women’s virtue did not differ in its essential 
character to that of men. There were precedents for this view in the writings of 
Plutarch and in the Christian belief in equality of souls and a few notable 
eighteenth-century authors had also pursued this line of reasoning.44 The second 
line of argument was much more frequently voiced. This was based on the belief 
that women and men differed in the essential characteristics of their minds as 
well as their bodies by reason of their different natural functions. Women were 
designed by nature to be mothers, and this affected every aspect of their 
personalities. Consequently their virtues differed in character to those of men. 
Feminine virtue complemented rather than emulated masculine virtue, and 
promoted sensibility, feeling for others, and an instinctive sense of moral 
rightness. According to this view women shrank from taking part in public or 
political activity themselves, but by inspiring their husbands and sons they made 
it possible for men to be active citizens. Without women, therefore, men would 
not be virtuous.  
We should not, however, overemphasise the distinction between these two 
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forms of feminine virtue. They were not necessarily mutually exclusive, and it 
was not uncommon to find an author employing first one argument and then the 
other, depending on the strategy adopted.45 The particular association of women 
with bienfaisance drew on both these arguments. Bienfaisance or social virtue was 
believed to be a universal quality, transcending birth and gender. But it was 
claimed also that women had an especial affinity for bienfaisance as an extension of 
their natural compassion.  
In the 1780s there was a veritable cult of bienfaisance and women played a 
key role in it. In 1787 a certain Madame Gaston-Dufour took up her pen to deliver 
a scathing attack on the work of the Chevalier de Feucher who had argued that 
women were responsible for the decadence of morals. She compared the virtues 
of men and women at different stages of their lives and concluded that at each 
stage women possessed more virtue than men. Above all, women monopolised 
the social virtues. Of young women she said: ‘Chastity, sensibility, compassion, 
courage, are the virtues that have resonance for us, from the age of twelve years 
up until twenty’, whereas young men were dismissive of these qualities.46 
Speaking of older women, she said that it was they, not men, who carried out acts 
of bienfaisance: 
Let the Chevalier de Feucher, in order to convince himself of truth of what 
I have said, go and look in the local parish registers where the names of 
people who have carried out acts of bienfaisance are written, and he shall 
see if any names but those of women ever appear there. Men grow more 
hard and bitter as they age: whilst women become still more tender and 
feeling as they grow older; they cannot bear to witness people suffering 
without being of help to them, without aiding them with their own money; 
men, by contrast, will no longer part with a penny, unless it be to 
debauched women....47 
 
Ruth Graham has conducted some intriguing research into pamphlets on the 
social situation of women written by women and sympathetic men in 1788 and 
1789, including the unofficial ‘women’s cahiers’ that appeared in response to the 
calling of the Estates General.48 She demonstrated that the writers of such 
pamphlets were primarily concerned with the social and familial role of women. 
They built on the idea of the regenerative power of women’s virtue. Most of the 
pamphlet writers disagreed emphatically with Rousseau’s hostility towards 
socially active women. Rather, they argued that women’s special talents fitted 
them to play a more significant social role than had heretofore been granted. 
It has been argued that the network of masonic lodges provided a temporary 
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haven for social equality to exist, which contrasted with the rigid social hierarchy 
of ancien régime society. Some lodges in France admitted women, but historians 
have disagreed over the impact of this. Some believe that it led to an actual 
empowerment of women, whilst others argue that they were marginalised in 
what was essentially a male institution.49 One thing we can note, however, is the 
extent to which the rhetorical ideals of freemasonry (with their emphasis on social 
virtue) were open to a variety of strategic interpretations which emphasised the 
power of feminine virtue. One argument which might be made was that female 
virtue was equal to that of men. In 1782, a woman freemason addressed her 
‘brothers and sisters’ in her lodge with the assertion that, ‘just as there is no 
sexual distinction for the soul, so neither is there any sexual distinction for the 
virtues’.50 More typical, however, were the more conventional terms used by 
Mathon de la Cour when he addressed women members of the Loge d’Adoption du 
Patriotisme. He spoke in flattering terms of women’s bienfaisance, sensibility and 
virtue but he claimed that the principal role of women’s virtues was to inspire 
men with patriotism and active virtue.51 
 
The Revolution of 1789 gave a new dimension and relevance to debates on 
the social and political role of women’s virtue. The transformed political context 
places the revolutionary debates outside the scope of the present article. But 
before concluding, there are some continuities we should note. During the 
Revolution a number of women participated in a socially powerful - and socially 
acceptable - role as active members of the many comités de bienfaisance, which were 
set up to replace the traditional activities of the Church in the dispensation of 
charity. Olwen Hufton has shown that whilst it was men who directed these 
revolutionary comités it was women who carried out most of the actual work of 
visiting the poor.52 In some ways this division of labour reflected women’s 
traditional role in the Church of dispensing charity to the poor. The reaction of the 
constitutional clergy to women who assumed greater authority in this sphere 
during the Revolution was sometimes ambiguous or hostile.53 These comités 
formed part of a series of institutions set up to deal with the gap left by the 
dismantling of the social functions of the Church. But we have seen that the 
thinking that inspired them went back at least to the mid-century. In addition to 
the comités de bienfaisance, there were also schemes for women to be actively 
involved in the education of small children, the care of the sick and poor, and 
even for women to form a ‘bureau for the general surveillance of morals’, a kind 
of moral police for republican virtue.54 
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The problems underlying the relationship of women to politics, virtue, 
equality, education and citizenship were just beginning to be addressed. The 
great majority of revolutionaries (including women) endorsed the view that 
women’s virtues differed from, and complemented, those of men; women’s 
public role was an indirect one - to facilitate the regeneration of morals in the new 
society. Few political theorists were prepared to adopt the idea that virtue was the 
same quality for men and women; but those who did so found that they had a 
radical new argument with which to rethink political rights and citizenship. The 
marquis de Condorcet’s Sur l’Admission des femmes au droit de cité (1790) traced the 
arguments for equality between the sexes and women’s right to citizenship. 
Women, he said, had the same qualities as men, including the ability to acquire 
‘ideas about morality’. Whilst women were superior to men in ‘the gentle and 
domestic virtues’, neither were they lacking in ‘the virtues of the citizen’ when 
there was need. 55 Across the Channel, the first great feminist writer, Mary 
Wollstonecraft, was inspired by the Revolution to use the rhetoric of virtue as the 
basis for the first sustained argument to state that women had a right to equality 
and an active public voice. Her Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) would 
expose some of the weaknesses (as well as the strengths) of optimistic arguments 
based on equality which did not also take into account differences and what she 
would later term, the particular ‘wrongs of woman’. Her arguments would take 
the debate onto a different level, but were only made possible by the long-
standing rhetorical tradition of using ideas about women’s virtue as a polemical 
strategy for their empowerment. 
The discourse of feminine virtue provides a thought-provoking counterpoint 
to the mainly masculine discourses of political virtue. It shows us that the same 
discourse that could be used to empower and bestow a right to participate, could 
also condition and entrap the speaker. The rhetoric of virtue was double-edged 
for women, certainly, and not without its problems and ambiguities. But it 
provided strategic possibilities which could be exploited. Virtue in its civic sense 
left little space for women in the public sphere. But women were not completely 
passive agents in this discourse. They could, and did, employ notions of moral 
virtue and bienfaisance to justify arguments that women could play an active role 
in society to improve public manners and morals. Models of virtue such as Zilia 
and Julie may seem limited now, but they represented a considerable step 
forward in the way that women were being represented during the eighteenth 
century. The language of virtue was employed within the social confines of what 
was possible for women at that time. But at its more radical edge it challenged the 
political and social conventions and provided a voice for women who, hitherto, 
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had been voiceless. 
 
Note: All the translations in this article, except where specifically 
acknowledged, are the author’s own. 
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